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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
This is an appeal
Mislaid
Degree.

from a conviction of Theft

or Mistakenly Delivered Property, a
Jurisdiction vests in

felony of the Third

this Court pursuant

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure

of Lost,

to Rule 26,

and Section 78-2A-3, Utah

Code

Annotated, 1953, as amended.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTFD ON APPEAL
STANDARD OF REVIEW
err

Did the trial court
juror
who

who was related by
knew the witness

dismiss

a

marriage to a

well?

prospective

discretion of the trial

in not dismissing for

prosecution witness and

Standard

of Review:

for

is

juror
court.

cause

"A motion to

within the

651

sound

When reviewing such a ruling, we

reverse only if the trial court has abused its discretion.
v.

cause a

State

Woolley, 810 P.2d 440, 442 (Utah App.) cert, denied, 826 P.2d
(Utah 1991), cited in State v.

Cox, 826 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah

App 1992).
Did
the

the State produce

verdict of the jury?

sufficiently

the

Standard

inconclusive

reasonable minds

must have

Defendant committed

sufficient evidence

or

of Review:
inherently

Evidence must be
improbable

entertained a reasonable

the crime

of which

he

State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 902, 903 (Utah App. 1990).
- 1 -

to support

that

doubt that

was convicted.

Did the trial Court abuse its discretion by failing
consider all
sentence?

legally relevant
Standard of

factors in imposing

Review:

Actions of

to

an excessive

trial judge were so

inherently unfair as to constitute abuse of discretion.

State v.

Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885. (Utah 1978).

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES
Rule 18, Utah Rules Criminal Procedure
Section 76-3-404, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

Defendant
Information
Delivered

Dale

(R-1) with
Property,

Section 76-6-407,

a

Richard

Schultz

Theft

of Lost,

Third

Degree Felony,

Utah Code Annotated,

was

charged

Mislaid, or
in

by

Mistakenly

violation

1953 as amended,

of

in the

Seventh District Court in and for Grand County, State of Utah for
acts allegedly occurring on
was

accused of

or about April 15, 1992.

obtaining golf clubs

$250.00 but less than

with a value

Defendant

of more than

$1,000.00, without having taken reasonable

means to return them to the owner, with the purpose
the owner of the property.

- 2 -

of depriving

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

Defendant's First

on August

Appearance was

After

a Preliminary Hearing on September

Bruce

K.

Halliday signed

a

20, 1992.

9, 1992, the Honorable

bindover order.

Arraignment was

October 14, 1992 before the Honorable Boyd Bunnell.
A

one day

jury trial

was held

on January

25, 1993,

presided over by Judge Halliday.
At trial,
excused due
the

before Voir Dire some

to personal or

rest of

it,"

potential jurors were

business relationships and

(Trial Transcript

- 5, hereafter

"some of
Tr. Tr.).

After the swearing of the venire panel the jurors were questioned
as to their relationship
to the county attorney
to

witnesses

enforcement

to

Ray Dean

responded

(Tr.

(Tr.

counsel or
Hopper,

that his

son

Tr.

Tr.

as to

-

-

10);

Juror #17
was married

on
to

or affinity

relation

15); and

witnesses (Tr.

Richeson, a witness for the State
by the Court

8 ) ; relationship

(Tr. Tr. - 9 ) ; consanguinity

counsel

personnel

relationship
juror,

or

to counsel (Tr. Tr. -

again

Tr.

the Jury

to

personal

- 25-6).
List

the daughter

law

One

(R-96),
of

Glen

(Tr. Tr - 26), When questioned

whether this relationship

would affect

his

credence of Mr. Richeson's Testimony over that of another witness
Mr. Hopper responded "I don't know."
- 3 -

(Tr. Tr. 27). When asked

by

the

Court

if he

Richeson's testimony,

could

proceed if

he

didn't

juror Hopper responded

believe Mr.

"No."

(Tr.

Tr. -

27).
Although there is
Hopper grudgingly
basis

a very brief interval in which Juror

states that

he can

make up

his mind

on the

of the testimony elicited, his final opinion as to whether

he can fairly judge all of the testimony presented here is "I - I
guess not, probably not"! (Tr. Tr. - 28).
Counsel for
of Mr. Hopper

Defendant made a tiny

challenge for cause

(Tr. Tr. - 30), which was denied by the Court (Tr.

Tr. - 31).
During
he had

trial the owner of the

seen the Defendant on

identified

him

having been

at counsel

golf clubs alleged that

the night the clubs
table (Tr.

able to identify

Tr.

were lost and

- 56), despite not

him proximate to

the time of

the

incident from a photo line-up. (Tr. Tr. 57, 105).
During

trial

several

witnesses

testified

that

Mr.

Schultz had told them that he had found the golf clubs in a creek
by the
fact,

high school (Tr.

Tr. - 75, 84,

when interviewed by the

police as a

provided a written statement that he
creek (Tr. Tr.

- 110).

97, 101, 110,

Defendant

In

suspect, Mr. Schultz

had found the clubs in
took the stand and

that he had found the clubs (Tr. Tr. - 114).
- 4 -

112).

the

testified

C.

DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT

After

a

verdict of

deferred sentencing for the

guilty

by

the jury,

the

Court

preparation of a pre-sentence report

(Tr. Tr. - 160). At the first scheduled sentencing Defendant was
absent due

to his placement in

Nebraska

the Open Door Mission

(February 24 Sentencing Transcript

in Omaha,

- 2 (SI)).

Due to

his presence there, Adult Parole and Probation had been unable to
prepare a pre-sentence report (SI -

3 ) . Mr. Schultz did contact

his attorney with his whereabouts (SI - 3 ) .
The Court issued a warrant for his arrest.
At the second sentencing hearing counsel requested that
the

Defendant be

originally

evaluated

ordered

Transcript - 2

by

(S-2)).

the

by Adult
Court

Parole

(June

and Probation

16,

Despite the arguments

1993

as

Sentencing

of counsel

that

Defendant was attempting to rehabilitate himself, had had counsel
in Nebraska,

may not have known

conviction since
victim, and
County

1981, had

had already

where to report, had

not caused significant

served substantial

no felony

loss to

jail time

the

in Grand

(S-2 - 3-6), the Court sentenced Defendant to the maximum

term of imprisonment ignoring its previous concern
that a

pre-sentence report would

Defendant.
- 5 -

be valuable in

assessing this

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The

trial court

both failed

to adequately

probe the

bias of juror Hopper, denying Defendant his right to an impartial
jury

and wrongfully

denied Defendant's

challenge for

cause of

Hopper.
The

substantive

case presented

by

the

State is

so

inherently weak that reasonable minds must entertain a reasonable
doubt as to Defendant's guilt.
The

trial court

improperly abused

denying Defendant additional time

its discretion

in

before sentencing to allow his

continued rehabilitation and for a pre-sentence report.

ARGUMENT
I.

JUROR BIAS

The

Court

of

Appeals

has

previously

defined

the

investigation necessary by the court to prove potential bias by a
juror.

While the level of investigation necessary once Voir Dire

reveals potential
exploration
inference

juror

thereof
of

bias

bias

varies from

cannot mearly
rebutted

case

be pro

simply

by

forma.
a

to

case,
Nor

subsequent

statement by the juror that he or she can be impartial.
Woolley, 810 P.2d 440 (Utah App. 1991).

- 6 -

the

is the
general
State v.

Defendant
jurors in a
1984).

has a right to a fair and impartial panel of

criminal trial

Indeed,

adequately

the

State v. Hewitt,

trial

court

itself

aware of that requirement

jurors as noted (Tr. Tr.

- 5).

689 P.2d 22
seemed

(Utah

more

than

when it sua sponte excused

Further the court

for Defendant's rights in it Voir Dire.

However,

showed regard
once the trial

Court discovered the bias, no adequate rehabilitation of panelist
Hopper occurred.
Utah Rule
that

grounds

affinity,

for a

or

fiduciary or

of Criminal

the

challenge

existence

Procedure 18(e)(3) &
for cause

of any

and any party, witness

or person....

consanguinity or

are

social,

other relationship between

(4) state

legal,

business,

the prospective

juror,

Section (e)(14) of Rule 18

Utah Rules Criminal Procedure allows a challenge for cause if the
juror has
acting

a state

of mind

impartially and

which

will prevent

without prejudice.

Thus

him [her]

from

three grounds

validate Defendant's challenge.
Although Wool ley, supra, is helpful in

determining the

depths of inquiry sufficient to clarify potential juror bias, the
point is really
inquiry

was

moot.

In

completed, the

the instant case,
challenged

after the

juror,

far from

Court's
being

rehabilitated allowed as to how he could probably not judge all
- 7 -

of the testimony presented impartially.
which

facially

question

"When comments are

a prospective

juror's

made

partiality

or

prejudice, an abuse of discretion may occur unless the challenged
juror is removed by

the Court or counsel investigates

the inference rebutted"
App.

1992),

1989).

State v.

citing State

Panelist

Cox, 826 P.2d

v. Cobb,

Hopper

774

and finds

656, 660

P.2d 1123,

(Utah

1125 (Utah

nor the inference

was neither removed

rebutted.
The Cox case, at 659, again citing Cobb provides, "[I]t
is prejudicial error to
challenge

to remove

removed for cause."
challenge left

compel a party to exercise

a jury

panel member

In this

with which

a peremptory

who should

case, Defendant did not even have a
to remove Hopper,

presumably because

other panelists existed who caused greater concern.
by the

Court to leave that

have been

juror on the panel

Defendant.

to

association

with a witness or party has developed a relationship

indifferent
(Utah 1977).

juror, who

was thus fatally

prejudicial

of affection, respect or

"A

The decision

through

a personal

esteem, cannot be deemed disinterested,

or impartial..
Leaving such a

State v. Brooks,

563 P.2d

juror is reversible

Court.

- 8 -

799, 802

error by

the

II-

SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT
MARSHALLING THE EVIDENCE
At

trial the

State

clubs and his father.

presented the

The owner, Derek Daye,

1992 he went on a golf

April 15,

(Tr. Tr. - 49-50).

Upon the

clubs outside City Market.

owner of

the golf

testified that on

trip with his high school team

return to Moab,

he left his

golf

He identified the clubs by brand name

(Tr. Tr. - 51), and by referring to State's exhibit 1, which were
photographs
Defendant.

of
He

the golf

clubs (Tr.

identified the

Tr.

- 53)

Defendant as having

recovered from
been in

his

vicinity on April 15 (Tr. Tr. - 56.7).
His father, Robert Daye similarly identified the

clubs

name (Tr. Tr.

Tr. -

by brand

- 45) and through

exhibit 1 (Tr.

44) .
The individual
they

were

recovered

who was in possession of the clubs when

by

law

testified that he purchased
The clubs

were recovered May

enforcement,

William

Williams,

them from Defendant (Tr. Tr.
27, 1993 (Tr.

Tr. - 65)

- 68).
and were

purchased by Mr. Williams about two weeks prior to that time (Tr.
Tr. - 68) .
There was adequate testimony
as to value (Tr. Tr. - 91).
- 9 -

from a golf

professional

Defendant made
police

an oral and a written

statement to the

acknowledging that he had had possession of the clubs and

had delivered them to Mr. Williams.

The

Statements varied as to

whether he had sold them or given them away (Tr. Tr. - 102).
Defendant testified at trial that he gave

the clubs to

Mr. Wi11iams (Tr. Tr. - 116).

INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
The
evidence

above section

supporting

magnificent

array,

Defendant's

position

untenable even when
Court below.

sets out

the

jury

the

paucity

that

verdict.

the

viewed in

every scrap

of

For
the

verdict

of competent
from

above

being

a

strengthens

is

unwarranted

and

the light most

favorable to

the

State v. Day, 815 P.2d 1345, 1351 (Utah App. 1991),

citing State v,

Moore, 802 P.2d

732, 739 (Utah

App. 1990)

and

Schurf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
While this Court must view the evidence, along with the
reasonable inferences from it, in the light most favorable to the
verdict
(Utah

Moore, supra
1989), if

inferences

are

the

and State

v. Gardner,

Court finds

so inconclusive

that
or

789 P.2d

"the evidence

inherently

273, 285
and

its

improbable that

reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt" then

- 10 -

the

verdict must be overturned,

444

(Utah

1983).

This

is

State v. Petree,

exactly the

659 P.2d 443,

conclusion

Defendant

argues.
The fatal flaw in

the State's case is the

evidence of wrongdoing by Defendant.
Jonas,

793 P.2d 902 (Utah

lack of any

In a similar case, State v.

App. 1990) the

Defendant asserted he

did not know the received property was stolen and thus lacked the
culpable mental state.
reverse, the

Although

the Court of

reasons to disbelieve

substantially convincing.

That case

Appeals did

Defendant in that

not

case were

involved seven transactions

occurring from July 1985 to May 1986.

The property was received

in a manner which should have raised questions about its status.
We have no
golf

clubs. He did not

officer
lying

analogy in this

purchase them from

or from anyone else.
in the

creek

in

case. Defendant found

Upon first

a garbage

sack

the

an undercover police
discovering the clubs
he

thought they

discarded trash and did not even retrieve them until

were

a couple of

days later (Tr. Tr. - 115).
Additional reason to discredit

the verdict lies in the

improbability of the identification of Defendant by the victim as
the person he had seen on the night of the loss of the clubs.
addition to the fact of Defendant's transfer of the property to
- 11 -

In

Mr. Williams, which Defendant
to

the jury

Defendant

testimony

freely admits, the State presented

from Mr.

as an individual

high school and City Market

Daye

he had seen

that he
in the

could

identify

vicinity of the

on the night of the loss.

Yet this

same witness was unable to pick Mr. Schultz out of a photo lineup
at an

earlier time.

(Tr.

Tr. -

59; 105).

Interestingly, the

witness apparently

could not "identify" Defendant

he

after he talked

had seen until

with his uncle

as the person
Scott, a law

enforcement offi cer.
This

unlikely

identification

inherently improbable standard.
to discern its effect

the

Without such testimony

Defendant's statement that

the

he innocently

clubs after they had been taken by another.

testimony the jury is

required

takes no leap of imagination

on the jury.

jury probably believes
found the

It

reaches

With such

disposed to determine Defendant the

actor

rather than an unlucky finder.
Such improbability mandates reversal.

III. SENTENCING
The Utah

Supreme Court has stated that a sentence will

not be disturbed unless
an

abuse

of discretion

it exceeds that prescribed by
State v.

Gerrard,

584 P.2d

law or is
885 (Utah

1978), cited in State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 1986),

-

1 9

-

State v. Russel1, 791 P.2d 188 (Utah 1990).

The judgment imposed

is within legal limits, however, it is an abuse of discretion.
The trial
report on

the day

court felt
of the

the necessity of

verdict.

perceived need by the Court

Clearly

a pre-sentence

this indicated

to gain information about

a

Defendant

to determine what actions were appropriate.
The pre-sentence report is
3-404

of the

Utah

Code.

Its

provided for in Section 76-

purpose in

information concerning the particular
judge

to

appropriately exercise

providing

intimate

Defendant is to enable the

his discretion

in sentencing.

Therefore rescinding the order for a pre-sentence report once the
Court

has

determined

"Although the judge was

its

need

is

an

abuse

not required to order the

the first place, he was not free arbitrarily
without

good

reasons

of

for so

doing."

discretion.
evaluation in

to revoke the order

Dissenting

opinion of

Justice Maughan, Gerrard, supra, at 889.
The

reason

reversible is because

that
it is

such

revocation

based on emotion

is

arbitrary

and

and contempt

for

Defendant rather than on the basis of a prepared report.
This case
Defendant committed

should

be

distinguished

and additional felony on

from

Shelby

probation.

Unlike

Mr. Schultz, who entered a treatment program voluntarily, the
- 13 -

the

Shelby

Court

found

that

significant changes in
warranted.

In

Defendant

his life.

this case,

warranted because

the

of

had

In Shelby

not

made

any

probation was

not

we cannot determine

the

wrongful decision

if probation
of

the

judge

is
to

rescind the evaluation.

CONCLUSION
Three bases of reversible
Panelist

Hopper was

error exists in this matter.

improperly allowed

to remain

after a valid challenge for cause by Defendant.
have

reasonable

doubts

as

to

Defendant's

on

the jury

Reasonable minds
guilt.

Denying

Defendant a presentence report after having declared the need for
one is an abuse of discretion by the trial court.
Defendant urges
sufficient
that

for reversal.

Defendant

was denied

trial, or that the
sentencing.
should be

that any

The

one of

the above

Cumulativley, there
his right

to

errors is

can be

a fair

and impartial

Court has abused its discretion in
jury verdict

resentenced after

must be

reversed,

no doubt

its harsh

or Defendant

appropriate investigation

by Adult

Parole and Probation.
DATED this

^>^\

day of

\I*v~l

i*/3d

, 1994.

Wi11iam L. schultz
Attorney for Defendant
14 -

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, William L.
of

]vii^o4_.

Schultz, certify that on
,

attached Appellant's Brief to
Utah, Counsel for

1994, I

the

7 ^

served four copies

the Utah General for the

Appellee to this matter, by mailing

day
of the

State of
to her by

first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following
address:
Attorney General
State of Utah
236 State Capitol Bldg.
Salt Lake City, UT 841 14

\AJ. 1

4

Wi11iam L. sdhultz

ADDENDUM

RULE 18, UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a particular
juror and may be taken on one or more of the following grounds:
(3)
consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to
the person alleged to be injured by the offense charged, or on
whose complaint the prosecution was instituted;
(4) the existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary
or other relationship between the prospective juror and any
party, witness or person alleged to have been victimized or
injured by the
defendant, which relationship
when viewed
objectively, would suggest
to reasonable
minds that
the
prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a
verdict which would be free of favoritism. A prospective juror
shall not be disqualified solely because he is indebted to or
employed b> the state or a political subdi/is'on t!'--"-^:
(14) that a state of mind exists on the part the juror with
reference to the cause, or to either party, which will prevent
him from acting impartially
and without prejudice to the
substantive rights of the party challenging; but no person shall
be disqualified as a juror by reason of having formed or
expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted to
such jury, found upon public rumor, statements in public journals
or common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court
that the juror can and will, not withstanding such opinion, act
impartially and fairly upon the matter to be submitted to him.

CRIMINAL CODE
76-3-404. Presentence investigation and diagnostic evaluation -Commitment of defendant -- Sentencing procedure.
(1)

(a) (i) In felony cases where the court is of the opinion
imprisonment
may be appropriate but desires more
detailed information as a basis for determining the
sentence to be imposed
than has been provided by the
presentence report, the court may in its discretion
commit a convicted defendant to the custody of the
Department of Corrections for a diagnostic evaluation
for a period not exceeding 90 days,
(ii) The Department of Corrections shall
conduct a
complete study and evaluation of the defendant during
that time, inquit m g iriLu matters incluC'i.o:
(A)
the defendant's previous delinquency or criminal
experience;
(B) his social background;
(C) his capabilities;
(D) his mental, emotional, and physical health; and
(E) the rehabilitative resources or programs which may
be available to suit his needs.
(b) (i) By the expiration of the commitment period, or by
the expiration of additional commitment time the court
may grant, not exceeding a further period of 90 days,
the defendant shal1 be returned to the court for
sentencing and the court, prosecutor, and the defendant
or his attorney shall be provided with a written
diagnostic evaluation report of results of the study,
including
any
recommendations the
Department of
Corrections or the Utah State Hospital believes will be
helpful to a proper resolution of the case,
(ii) Any diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court
is supplemental
to and
becomes a part
of the
presentence investigation report,
(iii) After receiving the diagnostic evaluation report and
recommendations, the court shall proceed to sentence a
defendant
in
accordance
with
the
sentencing
alternatives provided under Section 76-3-201.
(2)
Any commitment for presentence investigation under this
section does not constitute a commitment to prison. However, any
person who is committed to prison following proceedings under
this section shall be given credit against his sentence for the
time spent in confinement for a presentence investigation report.
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Criminal No. 9217-277
Held in the Courtroom of said Court, at Moab, Grand
County, State of Utah, on the 16th day of June, 1993, present the
Honorable Bruce Halliday, District Court Judge.
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Against:

DALE RICHARD SCHULTZ
DOB: 07/11/53
JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT TO UTAH STATE PRISON

William L. Benge, for Plaintiff
Sandra Starley, for Defendant
This being the day and hour fixed for pronouncing
judgment in this case, and the defendant being present in Court
and represented by counsel, Sandra Starley, and defendant having
heretofore been found guilty by a jury of the crime of:
THEFT OF LOST, MISLAID, OR MISTAKENLY DELIVERED
PROPERTY, a THIRD DEGREE FELONY, in violation of Section 76-6407, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended;
and the defendant stating to the Court that he has no legal

1

reason to advance why judgment should not be pronounced, the
Court now pronounces the judgment and sentence of the law as
follows, to-wit:
That you, DALE RICHARD SCHULTZ, be imprisoned in the
State Prison of the State of Utah, in the County of Salt Lake,
for a term NOT TO EXCEED FIVE (5) YEARS,
You, DALE RICHARD SCHULTZ, are hereby remanded to the
custody of the Sheriff or other proper officer of the Grand
County Jail of the State of Utah for transfer to the custody of
the Utah State Prison.
DATED this /g?

—76^
day of June, 1993.
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